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INTRODUCTION

I open with a story from the heyday of the Fourteenth
Amendment—the mid-1970s.
The state of Minnesota had
appealed a 1975 judgment ordering the state to upgrade
conditions in a state-run institution for “mentally retarded”
1
persons, including the installation of new carpeting.
As a
recovering legal services lawyer who had recently migrated to
academia, I went to watch the oral arguments in St. Louis. The
U.S. Court of Appeals panel included Judge J. Smith Henley, an
Arkansas judge whose deep-woods accent is hard for us Yankees to
imitate. The Minnesota assistant attorney general began by
observing that the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to
require states to install carpeting. “Young man,” Judge Henley
interrupted in a slow deep drawl, “I have been to y’all’s state capitol
up there in St. Paul, Minnesota, and I have seen the paintin’ of the
Minnesota regiment enterin’ the city of Little Rock. I just want to
remind you, suh, that that Fourteenth Amendment was not our
idea.”
The Fourteenth Amendment has been a remarkable source of
law for the advancement of human rights. Regardless of whose
idea the Fourteenth Amendment might have been, the State of
2
Minnesota lost its argument over carpeting.
I do not know
whether the State is still required to keep the carpeting in repair,
but it will be useful, I hope, to go back forty or fifty years and see
where we have come from and where we are today.
The central question is the extent to which the legal victories
for equality in our era—whether in the courts or the legislatures—
survive or are overwhelmed by economic and political forces.
My starting point in this inquiry is a remarkable speech in
1965, several months following the passage of the landmark Civil
3
Rights Act of 1964. The speaker said:

1. Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
2. Id. The case was about a lot more than carpeting—such as conditions of
confinement, staffing, and the right to decent treatment. Id. at 1126. Judge
Henley wrote the opinion upholding the district court decision of Judge Earl R.
Larson. Id. at 1124. Luther Granquist of the Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis
represented the plaintiffs. Id. at 1123.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 82-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–2000h-6 (2006)).
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You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by saying:
“Now you are free to go where you want, do as you desire,
and choose the leaders you please.” You do not take a
person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and
liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race
and then say, “You are free to compete with all the
others,” and still justly believe that you have been
completely fair . . . .
This is the next and more profound stage of the battle
for civil rights. We seek not just freedom of opportunity—
not just legal equity but human ability—not just equality
4
as a right and a theory but equality as fact and as a result.
The speaker was President Lyndon B. Johnson delivering the
5
The
commencement address at Howard University in 1965.
speech is a historical marker; it was probably the high point of the
struggle for equity and equality in my lifetime. And, to a certain
extent—especially in economics—you might say it has been mostly
downhill from there.
II.

THE “WAR ON POVERTY”

The battle for economic justice, which President Johnson
called the “War on Poverty,” foundered as he became obsessed
with—and bogged down by—the Vietnam War. The moral
denunciation of the war by Martin Luther King, Jr. and other civil
rights leaders split President Johnson from the civil rights
6
movement. There were legislative victories, such as the Voting
7
Rights Act of 1965 and the laws against housing discrimination and
8
But the fervor to change the
age discrimination in 1968.
economic conditions that produced poverty has had few lasting

4. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard
University: To Fulfill These Rights (June 4, 1965), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 635, 636 (1966).
5. JAMES T. PATTERSON, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE OVER BLACK FAMILY LIFE FROM LBJ TO OBAMA ix (2010).
6. See, e.g., HAMPTON SIDES, HELLHOUND ON HIS TRAIL: THE STALKING OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUNT FOR HIS ASSASSIN 22–24
(2010).
7. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971–1974e (2006)).
8. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2006)); Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
621–634 (2006)).
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remnants—the legal services program is one, of course. If there
was a victory in Vietnam, it was the defeat of the “War on Poverty.”
When the “War on Poverty” was fully engaged, the courts were
a hope for progress in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Following
the landmark school desegregation case of Brown v. Board of
10
Education in 1954 and the political equality cases such as Reynolds
11
v. Sims, which struck down malapportioned legislatures, there
were those in the 1960s and 1970s who believed that courts were
where the action was when it came to advancing social justice.
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 reinvigorated legal
services programs and brought them to a scale previously thought
12
unimaginable.
Legal Assistance of Ramsey County (LARC)
received enormous increases in funding, staffing, and mission from
13
its days as a bar association-funded program for the poor. In that
same era, there came from these landmark court decisions a belief
that courts should be a primary focus of what was called “law
14
reform.”
On a more subtle and understandable level, judicial decisions
were beginning to be understood better in their proper context,
that is, as sparks to legislated changes. In a democracy, after all,
the only way that change can endure is by coming through the
legislative process. Well, “only” is perhaps a little too strong. As we
have seen in recent years, there has been a serious limit to what
courts in their confined adjudicative roles can or should do to
15
advance causes that encompass a concept of “social justice.”

9. See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat.
378 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2006)); see also Tom I. Romero II &
Bruce A. Beneke, 100 Years Strong: Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services and the
On-Going Pursuit for Equal Rights and Equal Justice, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1,
8–17 (2009) (explaining the resources that the Office of Economic Opportunity
provided to legal services organizations, including Legal Assistance of Ramsey
County, beginning in 1964).
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
12. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508,
repealed by Act of Aug. 13, 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 519.
13. Romero & Beneke, supra note 9, at 11–13.
14. Id. at 12.
15. See, e.g., Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, and
the Courts: A Dialogic Approach to Education Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 99, 110–
13 (1996) (stating that judicial intervention in education has not “resulted in
meaningful reform” and noting that a majority of attorneys involved in
desegregation litigation have “expressed general dissatisfaction with the results of
[the] litigation”).
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LITIGATE, LEGISLATE, OR BOTH?

The point was brought home to me rather forcefully, and
personally, a couple of years after I left the LARC program in St.
Paul, when I inherited a case at Black Hills Legal Services in Rapid
City, South Dakota, where I was director for a few years in the early
1970s. The client was a girl who wanted to play Little League
baseball, and her complaint was pending before the South Dakota
Human Rights Commission. I was intrigued but not overwhelmed
by the case, unsure as I was of its value in enhancing the economic
interests of the poor. However, it was important to the client, so I
pursued it and won before the Human Rights Commission. The
Little League organization sought review in the circuit court, and I
won again. Expecting to be marched to the Supreme Court of
South Dakota, I waited. What I found, in short order, was that the
South Dakota legislature amended the human rights statute to
16
exclude voluntary youth athletic programs. I do not remember the
client’s name; I think it was Megan—so call it Megan’s law, if you
17
will.
This, of course, was before anyone thought of naming a
statute after a person.
The larger point is that cases inevitably have a political
context. We ignore this at our peril. When I was in South Dakota,
I did some successful lobbying on a mental health bill, a rape shield
18
law, and a landlord-tenant bill. I had a pretty good year in 1974,
before they figured out who I was and what I was up to. When I
mentioned these efforts at meetings of legal services directors in
the mid-1970s, the common reaction was: “What could you be
thinking? How can you get your hands dirty in the political
process?” Well, actually, a successful legislative effort goes a long
16. The exclusion of voluntary youth athletic programs persists. See S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-22 (2010).
17. In a possibly related development, Governor Richard Kneip appointed
me to the South Dakota Commission on the Status of Women in 1975. Officials of
the Department of Social Services asked the governor to withdraw the
appointment because I frequently had sued the state on behalf of legal services
clients. The controversy became moot when I left the state a couple of months
later to begin teaching in St. Louis. I assume the status of women in South Dakota
has proceeded in my absence.
18. See, e.g., Michael A. Wolff, A Balancing Act: Strengthening South Dakota’s
Landlord-Tenant Law, 22 S.D. L. REV. 15 (1977). The article includes my attempt to
use informal legislative history, in a state that has no formal legislative history, to
advance what I believed was a proper interpretation of the law. Id. at 16–19. It was
a youthful indiscretion: today I believe such use of “legislative history” to be less
than legitimate.
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way to making the kind of permanent change on behalf of legal
services clients that we and the clients think is desirable. In fact,
such changes can be so effective that, for most of its existence, the
Legal Services Corporation law has forbidden legal services lawyers
19
from doing legislative advocacy.
IV.

LIMITS OF “LAW REFORM”

Brown v. Board of Education and the ensuing fifty years of
litigation and legislation teach us something about the limits of
adjudicated law reform in a democratic society. Brown, of course,
did spur major societal changes in an era in which the legislative
branches of the federal and state governments were unable or
20
unwilling to correct the apartheid in public education. The Brown
decision also illustrated the evolving role of courts in (1) correcting
“wrong” decisions and (2) changing legal standards to suit
changing needs—a role in line with the common law
understanding that the law progresses as society’s views change.
That role was quite evident, for example, in the recognition of the
rights of gays to marry that was identified in court decisions in
21
22
23
24
Massachusetts, Iowa, Connecticut, and earlier in Vermont, as
25
well as legislative changes in the latter state.
The Brown decision produced in the South, particularly in
border states such as Missouri, an extraordinary resistance to
desegregation. Brown’s progeny got federal courts involved in the
management of schools, specifically in the assignment of pupils,
the busing of students, and the development of “magnet” schools

19. 42 U.S.C. § 2996(f) (2006); see also Rebekah Diller & Emily Savner,
Restoring Legal Aid for the Poor: A Call to End Draconian and Wasteful Restrictions, 36
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 687, 701–02 (2009); Paula Galowitz, Restrictions on Lobbying by
Legal Services Attorneys: Redefining Professional Norms and Obligations, 4 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 39, 40–41 (1994).
20. See Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics
Divide, 89 B.U. L. REV. 539, 549–50 (2009) (noting how “Brown helped inspire the
civil rights movement”); Linda C. McClain, Supreme Court Justices, Empathy, and
Social Change: A Comment on Lani Guinier’s Demosprudence through Dissent, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 589, 602–04 (2009).
21. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 972 (Mass. 2003)
(Greaney, J., concurring).
22. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 889–92 (Iowa 2009).
23. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 478 (Conn. 2008).
24. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999).
25. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (Supp. 2010).
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26

to affect racial desegregation. Judge Gerald Heaney of Duluth,
who died recently, was probably better known in St. Louis than in
St. Paul. He wrote twenty-seven opinions in St. Louis desegregation
27
cases as a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals. Would this happen
28
with today’s Eighth Circuit?
The political resistance to school desegregation decisions was
sufficiently strong that, throughout the period of the 1970s and
1980s, there were serious proposals in Congress to change the
jurisdictional statute for the federal courts to exclude school
29
desegregation cases. Were it not for a few principled senators—
30
some liberal, some conservative—that measure would have passed.
An equally large and looming problem in public education was
the disparity of resources that was coming to the attention of the
31
courts, both federal and state.
The movement in the federal
26. See, e.g., Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S.
1221, 1226–27 (1971) (discussing whether a given desegregation plan trespasses
limits on school bus transportation and holding this issue cannot be determined
from a recital of a one hour average travel time, but three hours would be
offensive when school facilities are available at a lesser distance); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971) (stating that a student
assignment plan is not acceptable simply because it appears to be neutral); Jenkins
v. Missouri, 981 F.2d 1009, 1014 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding a voluntary school
desegregation plan in which all students participating in the plan would transfer
to newly constructed magnet or collaborative schools as a single minority outpost
in an overwhelmingly nonminority school district is constitutionally suspect on its
face).
27. Dennis Hevesi, Gerald W. Heaney, a Judge Who Ruled for the Desegregation of
Public Schools, Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2010, at A19, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/us/23heaney.html. For an example of
one of the twenty-seven St. Louis desegregation cases, see Liddell v. Bd. of Educ.,
121 F.3d 1201 (8th Cir. 1997).
28. See generally JEFFREY BRANDON MORRIS, ESTABLISHING JUSTICE IN MIDDLE
AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT 342 (2007) (noting the “more conservative course” of the Eighth Circuit
in recent years).
29. See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. 856 (1987) (introducing H.R. 160, 100th Cong.);
127 CONG. REC. 2494 (1981) (introducing H.R. 1180, 97th Cong.); 120 CONG. REC.
1787 (1974) (introducing H.R. 14761, 93d Cong.).
30. See Max Baucus & Kenneth R. Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on
the Constitution, the Courts, and Congress, 27 VILL. L. REV. 988, 992–94 (1982)
(outlining the various jurisdiction-stripping proposals being considered by
Congress in the early 1980s). Senator Baucus argued that the proposals’
constitutionality was questionable and that their passage could harm the
legitimacy of the Constitution, the courts, and Congress. Id. at 995–1011. See also
Lloyd C. Anderson, Congressional Control over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A
New Threat to James Madison’s Compromise, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 417, 427–28 (2000)
(noting ways opponents of the legislation argued against its passage in the 1980s).
31. See generally JOHN E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
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courts was cut off quickly by the decision of the Supreme Court in
32
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez in 1973. In Rodriguez, the
Court held that there was no fundamental right to education and
that the equal protection claims of the school children in San
Antonio would not be recognized, despite the great disparities in
33
spending between and among school districts in Texas.
Before Rodriguez, the LARC program had a go at economic
34
equality in federal court. The case, Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,
survived the state’s motion to dismiss with an opinion that
delineated some fine constitutional principles for the case if it were
35
to go forward. At that point, we LARC lawyers decided that we did
not have the money or the wits to litigate something that
complicated, and so declared victory after the legislature
36
significantly increased state funding for local school districts. The
strategy was modeled on the advice of the late Senator George
Aiken of Vermont, whose strategy for ending the endless war in
37
Vietnam in 1966 was simply to declare victory and go home.
Contemporary Justices in Parents Involved reinterpreted Brown
38
to mean that the Constitution is entirely color-blind, and that all
39
racial classifications violate the Equal Protection Clause. These
recent decisions may tell us more about the current state of judicial
activism than they do about equal protection.
V.

THE DISCOVERY OF STATE COURTS

The Rodriguez decision pushed advocates into the state courts.
The move violated a principle I call Haydock’s Avowal. When I
practiced with Roger Haydock at LARC in 1971, he told me about
going to state court to keep utility customers’ power from being
shut off without due process and how the judge said: “That’s a big
(1970).
32. San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
33. Id. at 37, 54–55 (1973).
34. 334 F. Supp. 870, 877 (D. Minn. 1971).
35. Id.
36. See Romero & Beneke, supra note 9, at 14.
37. Richard Eder, Aiken Suggests U.S. Say It Has Won the War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
20, 1966, at 1.
38. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 772
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 779; Joel K. Goldstein, Not Hearing History: A Critique of Chief Justice
Robert’s Reinterpretation of Brown, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 791, 796 (2008) (discussing the
anticlassificationist view of Brown as put forth by Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito in Parents Involved).
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corporation, isn’t it? I can’t enjoin them.” At that point, Roger
wrote a note to himself that said “I shall never go to state court
again.” The opposite advice came some years later in a lecture by
Justice William Brennan, who suggested that the Supreme Court of
the United States was becoming a rather poor place for the
adjudication of constitutional claims; the good Justice advised us all
40
to go to state courts. And so, Haydock’s Avowal was overruled by
41
Brennan’s Admonition.
The resulting move to state courts led to the discovery of state
42
constitutions. In addition to state constitutional provisions about
equal protection and equality, state constitutions also had
requirements that the state provide a system of free public
education for all children of a certain age. This became a fertile
subject for litigation strategies, and there were, in fact, quite a few
states in which state funding of public education was declared
unconstitutional because of the gross disparities between “rich”
43
districts and “poor” districts. It was in this 1970s and 1980s era
that many states adopted “equalization” formulas for distributing
state aid that were intended to—but did not—eliminate disparities
between rich and poor school districts. These formulas were
developed with some (but not much) regard for equal protection
principles. More realistically, the legislative changes reflected
political notions of fairness rather than a coherent legal doctrine of
40. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
41. Roger Haydock has had a highly successful career as a professor at
William Mitchell College of Law and has written many books about how to
practice law. Significant portions of Haydock’s writing can be useful for
practitioners in state courts. See, e.g., ROGER S. HAYDOCK ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
PRETRIAL LITIGATION (5th ed. 2001); ROGER S. HAYDOCK & JOHN O. SONSTENG,
ADVOCACY: EVIDENCE, OBJECTIONS, AND EXHIBITS (1994).
42. See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
179 (3d ed. 1999); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The
Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535,
550 (1986).
43. See, e.g., DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (1983) (“For
some [school] districts to supply the barest necessities and others to have
programs generously endowed does not meet the requirements of the
constitution.”); Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School
Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 192 (1995) (explaining that in Edgewood
Independent School District v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989), reh’g denied,
(Tex. 1989), found that “[c]hildren who live in poor districts and children who
live in rich districts must be afforded a substantially equal opportunity to have
access to educational funds,” so as not to violate Texas’s “efficient system”
education clause).
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44

INTENTIONAL INEQUALITY?

The school financing system that remains in most states is
pretty awful from the standpoint of disparity. I have thought
deeply about this subject; recently I was the sole dissenter in a case
that upheld Missouri’s formula for distributing state aid to public
45
education. Here is my deep thought: the persistence of inequality
in funding among school districts is intentional and, to an extent,
46
perhaps a matter of political necessity.
This is a stunningly depressing insight. But there is something
we should realize: in the United States of America, local control is
very important. Local control means not only control of curricular
decisions, but also the support that is necessary from local sources
to fund public schools. Public education in most states is highly
dependent on local property tax revenue, which in turn is
dependent on the willingness of local taxpayers to fund public
47
education. It’s as simple as that. In the states that have done the
most to equalize expenditures for public education, there have
been some attempts at “Robin Hood” provisions—that is, requiring
rich districts to contribute a certain amount of their largesse to a
pool to be distributed to poor school districts that, regardless of
how much tax effort they put forth at the local level, cannot raise
48
the kind of property tax that a rich school district can. Robin
49
Hood dies in the end. End of story.
44. See, e.g., William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat
from Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 554
(2006) (explaining the shift in judicial activity from equality to adequacy); Jeffrey
S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its Aftermath,
94 VA. L. REV. 1963, 1971–73 (2008) (explaining different methods used by states
to equalize school funding).
45. Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477, 495 (Mo. 2009) (en
banc) (Wolff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. Id. at 497.
47. Laurie Reynolds, Uniformity of Taxation and the Preservation of Local Control
in School Finance Reform, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1835, 1886–89 (2007); see also Comm.
for Educ. Equal., 294 S.W.3d at 497 (Wolff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (discussing the wide disparity of district spending per pupil among Missouri
school districts); Myron Orfield, The Region and Taxation: School Finance, Cities, and
the Hope for Regional Reform, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 91, 126–33 (2007) (examining the
impact on Michigan’s education system once Michigan voters finally passed a
property tax and school finance measure after eleven failed attempts).
48. Reynolds, supra note 47, at 1856 n.68.
49. JOSEPH RITSON, ROBIN HOOD: A COLLECTION OF ALL THE ANCIENT POEMS,
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DUE PROCESS AND EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS

We should cover due process because, after all, this is what we
legal services lawyers spent a good deal of our careers worrying
about. In the area of public benefits, our cases were mostly about
protecting the rights of individuals vis-a-vis government
bureaucracy. The injection of due process principles into the
provision of public benefits, or rather the protection against
arbitrary denials of public benefits, was an important advance in
50
terms of individual rights.
It probably does little to level the
economic playing field, which I will address toward the end of this
piece.
Employment discrimination cases have been a real source of
vindication for individual rights. The case brought by LARC in the
early 1970s alleging racial discrimination in hiring police officers
51
had long-term effects. These effects are recounted in a profile of
John Harrington, recently retired St. Paul Police Chief:
Harrington graduated from Dartmouth with a degree in
East Asian studies and religion, and a minor in Chinese,
and began looking for cop jobs in the big cities. No one
was hiring . . . .
“New York went bankrupt,” Harrington recalls. “They
laid off 2,000 cops in 1975 and 1976, and everywhere I
applied my senior year was flooded with New York
detectives. I’ve got this wonderful Ivy League degree and
they’ve got 100 collars they made last year. Guess who got
the job?”
Finally Harrington found a job in St. Paul, at least in
part because a Minnesota judge had ordered the
department to hire more black officers. There were just

SONGS, AND BALLADS, 231, 233 (Rowman & Littlefield 1972) (1795).
50. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–64 (1970); see also Jesse H. Choper,
Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1, 146–50 (1984) (discussing the impact that Goldberg has had on the
ability of welfare beneficiaries to request hearings at cancellation of benefits);
Note, Procedural Due Process in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86 HARV. L. REV. 880,
880 (1973) (stating that Goldberg “has had a dramatic impact on court decisions in
public housing cases”). For representative St. Paul case sww Norlander v. Schleck,
345 F. Supp. 595 (D. Minn. 1972).
51. The case, Norlander v. Schleck, is described in Romero & Beneke, supra
note 9, at 14 n.43. Bruce Beneke, the co-author, led the efforts over many years to
obtain the relief in Norlander and other employment and civil rights actions in St.
Paul.
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52

six black cops on the force at the time.
In recent years, the dominance of federal courts in civil rights
litigation has ended as state courts have come to play an
increasingly important role.
This is a shift that seems
counterintuitive to those who grew up thinking that courts whose
judges are accountable through elections would be more reluctant
to grant relief in civil rights cases than federal court judges who are
appointed to serve for life. The state courts, at least in Missouri,
recently have been much better places for such cases because,
53
interestingly enough, state juries understand these cases.
A word about jury trials briefly: when the Civil Rights Act of
1964 forbade employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
and so forth, the remedy was fashioned in such a way as to avoid
54
having jury trials. The problem as Congress correctly saw it was
that juries in the South—where many of the problems were most
plentiful—would not be amenable to blacks’ claims of racial
55
discrimination. When Congress subsequently provided a claim for
age discrimination and housing discrimination, the remedies

52. Rick Shefchik, True Blue: John Harrington ‘77, St. Paul’s Top Cop, Leaves the
Force After Three Decades of Service, DARTMOUTH ALUMNI MAG., July–Aug. 2010,
available at http://www.dartmouthalumnimagazine.com/true-blue.
53. See, e.g., State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82 (2003) (holding that
a civil action for damages for a personal wrong is triable by juries according to the
original Constitution of Missouri); see also Erin C. Hansen, State ex rel. Diehl v.
O’Malley Breaks Down the Wall: The Right to a Jury Trial in State Court Under the
Missouri Human Rights Act, 59 J. MO. B. 296, 307 (2003) (discussing the likely
impact of Diehl on Missouri state court dockets).
54. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963, H.R. REP. NO. 88914, at 12 (1963). The original version of the Civil Rights Act provided the
following remedies: injunction, reinstatement, or hiring of employees, and interim
earnings or amounts earnable. Id. Notably absent from this litany of options was a
jury trial. See id.
55. Congress was undoubtedly aware of the racial tensions in the South. See
generally HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
ACT OF 1962, H.R. REP. NO. 87-1370 (1962). It can be inferred from this
knowledge that racial tensions in the South were a factor in determining the
appropriate remedies under this act. Scholars generally have accepted this
proposition. See Christian N. Elloie, Are Pre-Dispute Jury Trial Waivers a Bargain for
Employers over Arbitration? It Depends on the Employee, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 91, 94 n.25
(2009) (citing M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and Summary
Judgments, 8 S. CAL. L. REV. & WOMEN’S STUD. 311, 357 (1999) (“The legislative
record for the 1964 Act reveals legislative unease with juries because they were
perceived to be hostile or unfriendly to civil rights claimants. This was certainly
the case with race discrimination, plainly the driving force behind the 1964 Act. . .
. Federal judges would be more receptive to victims of racial discrimination . . .
.”)).
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included damages and were thus eligible for jury trials. Jurors, of
course, understand age discrimination because a lot of jurors are
pretty old or know someone who is. Today, race and gender rights
are well established and can be vindicated in state court jury trials
and, since 1991, in federal employment discrimination cases as
57
well. That may be a sign of societal advancement. It is, at the very
least, a vindication of efforts to ban discrimination against blacks
58
and women serving on juries.
VIII.

MENTAL ILLNESS AND CRIME

In the 1970s, there was also a movement to give due process to
persons committed to mental hospitals who were alleged to be
59
mentally ill and in need of treatment. The due process movement
was premised on the notion that, once patients were afforded due
process rights and diverted from or released from mental
institutions, they could be treated successfully and adequately in
the community by the administration of the new psychotropic
medicines that were doing so well at controlling psychoses of
various kinds. Our belief was that the states would step up and
fund community mental health centers because it was so much
60
cheaper than maintaining mental hospitals.
56. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Demand for Judicial Review, 88 NW. U. L. REV.
372, 380 (1993) (stating that Title VIII forbids housing discrimination); Kimberlye
K. Fayssoux, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial by Jury:
Proposals for Change, 73 VA. L. REV. 601, 602 (1987) (stating that the creation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act brought about interpretive dilemmas with
the right to a jury trial). The Civil Rights Act of 1968 did not explicitly provide for
the right to a jury trial, but the Supreme Court held that because damages were
allowed, the right to a jury existed. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197–98
(1974). With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress statutorily
extended the right to a jury to all damages actions under the civil rights law.
Easterbrook, supra note 56, at 380 n.27.
57. Medina, supra note 55, at 312. For a critique of contemporary equal
employment enforcement, see Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth Is Out There:
Revamping Federal Antidiscrimination Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193 (2009).
58. E.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986); Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357, 370 (1979).
59. Nancy J. Knauer, Defining Capacity: Balancing the Competing Interests of
Autonomy and Need, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 321, 332 (2003).
60. See CHRIS KOYANAGI & DAVID L. BAZELON, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID
AND THE UNINSURED, LEARNING FROM HISTORY: DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS AS PRECURSOR TO LONG-TERM CARE REFORM 4–9, 16 (2007),
available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7684.pdf (describing the history
of deinstitutionalization and noting that many mental health policymakers
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Due process got a lot of mentally ill people out of hospitals.
But the patients did not take their medications, wandered the
61
streets, committed crimes, and ended up in prison. I can draw a
line that shows the declining population of mental hospitals in this
country in the 1970s and the early 1980s and then draw you
another line that shows the increase in population in state and
federal prisons. These two lines are not disconnected—as one goes
down, the other goes up. It is not quite that simple, but it is close—
if you don’t believe me, go to your local prison. Take your
psychiatrist with you. He or she may estimate the number of doses
of quality medications it might take to make it a happier place.
As to crime and punishment, the last forty years have seen an
interesting swing in thinking about the proper use of “prisons” or
“corrections.”
In the 1970s, as a result of some misguided academic studies, it
became commonly believed that in the area of rehabilitation of
criminals, “nothing works.” As a result, punishment in prison
became more common and more commonly accepted for a greater
62
range of crimes. Also in the same era, the superbly ineffectual
and counterproductive war on drugs was launched.
As a result of these factors, as well as the criminalization of
previously noncriminal conduct, we have been on a binge of
incarceration that was aided and abetted by an explosion of prison
building in the 1990s. The results are quite remarkable. Today,
63
one in thirty-one persons are under correctional control, and as of
64
2008 one in one hundred are in prison or jail. “If you build it,

assumed that community care provided a cheaper alternative).
61. Bruce A. Arrigo, Paternalism, Civil Commitment and Illness Politics: Assessing
the Current Debate and Outlining a Future Direction, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 131, 141 (1993);
see KOYANAGI & BAZELON, supra note 60, at 12–13.
62. See Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public
Safety Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1402–04 (2008)
(outlining the historical problem of sentencing disparity and the subsequent
development of the “nothing works” philosophy); see also ROGER K. WARREN,
EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE
JUDICIARIES 5 (2007) (unpublished paper) available at http://works.bepress.com
/roger_warren/1 (describing 1970s state sentencing policies as seeking “to control
crime by locking up many more offenders for longer periods of time”).
63. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31, THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN
CORRECTIONS 1 (2009), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org
/uploadedFiles/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_3-26-09.pdf.
64. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 3 (2008),
available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/report_detail.aspx?id=35904.
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they will come” (to misquote a popular movie).
The effects on minority populations have been particularly
dramatic. I ask any of you who recently have been to law school or
college, to answer one question: Where are the black men? We
have marginalized a lot of them by imposing felony sentences
involving drugs, drug trafficking, and the kinds of things that many
66
white people do without getting caught or getting a felony record.
The current decade has resulted in quite a few states
rethinking their rush to incarceration. At the same time, by a series
of decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States has made the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines—which I believe have been a source
of a great deal of injustice in the criminal justice system—advisory
67
rather than mandatory.
I should note, and not altogether as an aside, the difference in
judicial attitudes from the time when the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines became effective in 1987 and today. In 1987, judges in
office were used to having full discretion in sentencing and were
quite appalled by some of the cases in which they were required to
send offenders to prison under the new guidelines. This resulted
in more than a few federal judges declaring the guidelines to be
68
unconstitutional—decisions that were overturned on appeal.
Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States said that the
69
guidelines are only advisory; they cannot be mandatory.
The
effect was not immediately recognized by the current generation of
judges who were used to the guidelines and apparently did not
70
know quite what to do without them.
That is a remarkable
generational shift.

65. FIELD OF DREAMS (Gordon Company 1989).
66. JIM WEBB, A TIME TO FIGHT: RECLAIMING A FAIR AND JUST AMERICA 227–29
(2008).
67. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005); Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004).
68. See, e.g., Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1268 (9th Cir. 1988),
vacated, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989); see also United States v. Alatorre, 207 F.3d 1078,
1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (Bright, J., concurring); United States v. Hiveley, 61 F.3d
1358, 1363 (8th Cir. 1995) (Bright, J., concurring); United States v. Horton, 685 F.
Supp. 1479, 1488 (D. Minn. 1988).
69. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 246; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308.
70. Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 261,
270 (2009) (noting that, even following Booker, the Sentencing Guidelines still
received “considerable deference” as some judges “were simply no longer used to
exercising discretion, and worse, they did not believe that they knew how”).
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OVERRIDING ECONOMIC TRENDS

The developments in the law relating to equality have been
countermanded by economic trends, including federal taxation
policies, which have seriously widened the gap between the richest
and poorest in our society. It should hardly pass without notice
that in the 1950s the United States was first or second in the world
in health status and longevity of its citizens. Japan, on the other
hand, recovering from World War II, was far down the list. Today,
the income gap in the United States has broadened significantly.
The effect of this has moved the United States down from first or
second in longevity and health status to about thirtieth in the
71
world.
As income inequality soars, so do death rates, various
diseases, drug use, and obesity—you name it. Interesting research
in the field of epidemiology demonstrates the effect that income
72
inequality has on the society as a whole.

71. MICHAEL MARMOT, THE STATUS SYNDROME: HOW SOCIAL STANDING AFFECTS
OUR HEALTH AND LONGEVITY 61–81 (2005); see RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT,
THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER 73–87 (2009).
72. See WILKINSON & PICKETT, supra note 71, at 73–87.
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Figure 1: Relationship Between Income Inequality and Life
Expectancy

Figure 1 shows the relationship between income inequality and
life expectancy. The United States, which has high income
inequality, has one of the lowest life expectancies among
developed countries. (The charts in Figures 1–4 are reproduced
from RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL:
WHY GREATER EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER (2009), with
permission of the authors.)
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Figure 2: Relationship Between Income Inequality and Life
expectancy

Figure 2 indicates the effect of income inequality on health
and social problems. It is also an indicator of how extreme the
United States’ high income inequality and health and social
problems are when compared to other first-world countries.
This trend towards inequality has been enhanced by the tax
code of the United States. Since 1980, there has been a massive
shift of wealth to the highest income families and away from the
middle class. The era of tax cutting has relieved the highest
brackets from their tax burden and shifted that burden
disproportionately to the middle class. Alice Gresham Bullock,
former dean of Howard University Law School, puts it well:
Since 1981, federal tax laws have supported and even
encouraged the creation of the extreme income gap.
After helping to create this gap, these tax laws subsidize
the richest Americans, thereby exacerbating income
inequality.
...
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During the last three decades of the twentieth century,
incomes rose for all demographic groups. Over time,
however, the highest income households earned a much
larger share of pre-tax income. In 1979, the bottom four
quintiles (80% of taxpayers) earned 55% of pre-tax
income and the top quintile earned 45%. In the late
1980s and the first half of 1990s, each group earned
roughly one half of all income.
By 1996, however, the top 20% moved out ahead, and the
income disparity has skyrocketed ever since. The income
gap that exists today is between the very richest Americans
and everyone else.
There is no doubt the rich are getting richer. After
adjusting for inflation, in 2002 the richest 13,400
households had more than $5 for every dollar they had in
1970. The remaining 99% of households had only eight
cents more per dollar. . . . The top 1% saw the largest
increase . . . .
While substantial gains were being made at the top, the
bottom quintiles saw their pre-tax incomes decline by
73
more than 27%.

73. Alice Gresham Bullock, The Tax Code, the Tax Gap, and Income Inequality:
The Middle Class Squeeze, 53 HOW. L.J. 249, 250–52 (2010).
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Figure 3: Income Inequality in the US by Presidential
Administration

Figure 3 shows the growing income inequality between the rich
and the poor by presidential administrations, beginning with
President Ford in 1975. The disparity steadily increased and
peaked in 1993. Although the disparity decreased after 1993, it
again began increasing in 2000.
Coupled with the growing income and wealth inequality is the
notion that government is bad or that government is inept.
This is a relatively recent phenomenon dating from about
1980. There were two factors, I believe, that contributed to the
revolt of the taxpaying masses in the last thirty years: (1) a reaction
against “welfare” for the poor, a phenomenon that often times was
driven by the perception of the race of the welfare recipients, and
(2) welfare for the rich, that is, the enormous tax breaks and tax
incentives that are given to corporations and wealthy citizens. In
the latter category, most states have been on a drive to the bottom
in terms of giving tax incentives to companies to build businesses in
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74

the communities in their states. This goes to absurd length, where
a community will give tax-incremental financing or other tax
incentives to a big-box retailer, such as Wal-Mart, to build a big
store that employs lots of people, only to drive out of business the
smaller, indigenous businesses in the community. The use of
governmental power for corporate economic gain may be a
significant impetus to the contemporary “property rights”
movement.
The result of this era of government largesse is a distrust of
government that is quite pervasive. In the 1980s, there was the idea
that we should cut taxes because cutting taxes would produce more
government revenue. How? The lower tax burden would spur
75
innovation and investment, and the economy would grow bigger.
Closely akin, of course, was the idea that government was the
76
problem and that taxes should be lowered to “starve the beast.”
The result of the anti-tax fervor, particularly in the middle
class, is that there has been a massive disinvestment in human
infrastructure, that is, education, public health, and cultural
institutions that previously had been heavily dependent on public
support to thrive.
There is no better illustration of this massive disinvestment
than what has been happening with state-supported higher
education. The state-supported law school education that I
purchased in Minnesota for about $450 per year in 1967 to 1970
was an extraordinary bargain by today’s standards. Most of the law
school’s budget came from the Minnesota legislature; today, I
believe the University of Minnesota Law School gets less than 10
percent of its budget from the state. Here is what happened: when
state budgets got tight, higher education was the easiest thing to
cut. The cost of higher education can be passed on from taxpayers
to the tuition payers.
This is made easy by the federal
government’s student loan programs, which banks administered.
What a great business it was—the banks were getting about $60
billion a year for administering these loan programs—the banks
74. See generally Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce
Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1996)
(arguing that state tax incentives can actually harm the state’s citizens and that
such incentives should be restrained by the Commerce Clause).
75. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Time and the Laffer
Curve, 90 J. POL. ECON. 816, 819 (1982).
76. Katherine Pratt, Deficits and the Dividend Tax Cut: Tax Policy as the
Handmaiden of Budget Policy, 41 GA. L. REV. 503, 507 nn.17–18 (2007).
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bore no risk because the federal government insured and
77
guaranteed a return on the money. So the banks got $60 billion
for doing not much at all, a practice that ended recently under the
Obama administration. Perhaps that was an example of corporate
welfare.
The significance of this shift in funding from taxpayers to
tuition payers has made it difficult for families of modest means to
get a higher education for their children without the children
having to take on massive amounts of student loan debt. It is not
uncommon in the law school where I now teach for students to be
graduating with $150,000 to $200,000 in combined student loan
debt from their college and law school years. I became strikingly
aware of this a few years ago when a student who was a 3L in law
school told me she really wanted to be a public defender, a position
that had a starting salary of $32,000 per year. When she told me
that her student debt loan was $120,000, I really was taken aback,
but I said that I did not believe she could afford to be a public
defender. That’s just one small story about what this means and
what it is doing to us in terms of the opportunities that people may
have to serve in public service and other worthwhile but
nonlucrative endeavors.
X.

CIVIC CULTURE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY

I end by saying there is a need for a strong civic culture whose
main characteristic is a common understanding that there are
certain things that we as a society need to buy collectively for a
large number of our citizens who purchase them individually—
education, for example. Put another way, we need a civic culture
that recognizes the need for long-term investments in human
infrastructure. I refer specifically to public schools at all levels,
including higher education, as well as roads, parks, and cultural
institutions (the latter can be funded both publicly and privately).
Public health, including clean water and sewage disposal, as well as
traditional public health measures, is another area in which we
must invest collectively. All of the tax incentives for businesses to
move someplace do not mean very much if there is not an
77. See generally David M. Herszenhorn, Plan to Change Student Lending Sets Up
a Fight, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2009/04/13/us/politics/13student.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss
(describing the state of the student lending market in light of President Obama’s
plan to end the subsidized loan program).
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educated and healthy work force and an infrastructure of strong
institutions to support that population.
Human infrastructure probably matters most when it comes to
economic development of a region. There is a remarkable
contrast, for example, between Minneapolis-St. Paul, on the one
hand, and the St. Louis metropolitan area where I have lived
during the past thirty-five years, on the other hand. In 1970, the
78
Minneapolis-St Paul metropolitan area was 1.8 million people. St.
79
Louis was 2.3 million. Today, St. Louis has about 2.8 million in its
80
metro area, which means that it has kept pace with the birth rate.
Minneapolis-St. Paul, which has a long tradition of the civic culture
I am talking about, has a population of 3.2 million in its metro
81
area. I do not think people moved to the Twin Cities for the
weather and I doubt that they moved for low taxes because
82
Minnesota has one of the highest taxation rates in the country.
Businesses flourish where human beings have the means to be their
best. The Twin Cities area has a civic culture and traditions that
have supported and solidified the gains in legal rights of the past
forty years.
But this supportive environment seems fragile, and you can
lose it. Perhaps you are losing it. In the past decade, both
Minnesota and Missouri have experienced declines in average
household income that exceed the decline in the United States as a
whole. Minnesota’s economy seems to have been more resilient
than Missouri’s.
From 1999 to 2008, Minnesota’s average
household income, adjusted for inflation, dropped 9.6%, while
83
Missouri’s drop was 14.1%.
78. U.S. DEPT. OF CONGRESS, 1A 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION § 1, 25–44
(1973).
79. Id. at § 2, 27–43.
80. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION OF
METROPOLITAN AND MICROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2008
(2009), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables
/10s0020.pdf.
81. Id.
82. See FEDERATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATORS, STATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RATES (2010), available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/ind_inc.pdf.
83. From 1999 to 2008, the median household income (adjusted for inflation)
in the United States dropped from $52,587 to $50,303, a decline of 4.5%. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY STATE (2008), available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/h08.xls.
Minnesota’s average household income, which is well above the national average,
declined 9.6%, from $60,782 to $54,925 in that period. Id. Missouri’s average
household income, which was slightly above average at $53,475 in 1999, dropped
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Figure 4: Effect of Income Inequality on Health and Social
Problems in US States

Figure 4 shows the effect of income inequality on the health
and social problems of the fifty states. Minnesota has low income
inequality in comparison with the majority of states, leading to
fewer health and social problems.
XI.

CONCLUSION

My lesson from the past forty years: the struggle for equality,
for vindication of rights, is more than just a legal struggle. Political
and economic forces can erase the gains and hold back the
progress of the low-income clients for whom legal services and civil
rights lawyers fight legal battles. The persistence of inequality
affects the health and well-being of an entire society, not just the
clients for whom legal services and civil rights lawyers toil. There is
no doubt that legal services and civil rights lawyers have made real
14.1% to $46,038 in 2008, well below the national average. Id.
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changes in the lives of their clients. The gains brought through the
legal system take hold best when the state’s culture supports these
legal efforts with quality public education, public health, and
supportive civic institutions that can minimize economic inequality.
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